Wanted to share a few random thoughts about geopolitics. We’re entering an era of renewed great-power politics, where maps may be redrawn over the next decade, alliances will shift, and a new global order will emerge. What are the focal points and objectives?

Note: I am trying to come at this from a realistic and non-emotionally invested perspective. I am not declaring any of the next moves to be good or bad, just applying logic. Also, this was written by a person and not an LLM. Feels worth clarifying these days.

§Competing great powers

The US wants Greenland and can, in theory, take it with little resistance. Of course, this does not mean outright annexation is necessary or even optimal. It also has secondary interests in Canada, and a broader interest in coercing its hemisphere (including Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Canada) into alignment—potentially even full control over Canada and the Panama Canal.

Russia’s primary objective is Ukraine, with the Baltics as a secondary concern and the Caucasus and Central Asia as tertiary interests, likely more about alignment and influence than outright control.

China wants Taiwan. As secondary interests, it has the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and several points along the Sino-Indian border, with a tertiary, long-term interest in Outer Manchuria in Russia’s Far East.

§Military hierarchy and pressure points

In terms of military capability, the hierarchy is clear: the US, then China, then Russia.

Recipients of US pressure are Europe, Canada, and Latin America. The most consequential confrontation here is US–Europe. A serious break there would fundamentally reshape the global order and likely push Europe, Latin America, and Canada toward deeper alignment, with the Mercosur trade agreement as an early manifestation.

Russian pressure is directed at **Europe first and foremost, then the Caucasus, **and Central Asia. Russia and Europe have effectively been in a direct or proxy conflict for years, so that dynamic is already established. The Caucasus and Central Asia are marginal actors in this equation.

A pragmatic US–Russia alignment becomes plausible so long as current leaderships remain in place, as neither has fundamentally conflicting interests and both increasingly define Europe as the opposing pole. This would not be a formal alliance, but a narrow and tactical convergence.

China’s pressure points are Russia, Taiwan, and India. Beijing will not prioritise antagonising Russia and is content to defer that question. Taiwan is the real issue, but China believes it faces the US and potentially Japan, South Korea, and Australia there.

§China, the US and Taiwan

Interestingly, the US probably no longer sees itself playing a role of significance in any conflict around Taiwan. China needs to come to terms with their worries about Taiwan on the one hand being around an old world order that no longer exists “punishing” it, as well as simply not having what it takes to swallow the pain that an invasion of their own people across the Taiwan Strait would inflict.

Only the Chinese (on both sides of the Strait, ie the “hua ren” if you want to frame it as such) are stopping China from taking Taiwan, and that will be a bitter pill to swallow. But as a result, my base case is China kind of withers away in indignation and no conflict takes place here.

§Europe

Europe is the pivotal variable. If it remains weak, Russia deepens its position in Ukraine and builds a land corridor to Kaliningrad. Meanwhile the US takes and consolidates Greenland, illegal immigration continues from the south and Europe’s strategic relevance continues to erode completely on all sides.

If, however, Europe commits to remilitarisation simply due to having no choice, the implications are just as big. Border enforcement follows. Political cohesion and a harder conception of sovereignty follow. Remigration becomes a thing as governments become led by the right wing. Immigrants may start to fill a sort of domestic foreign legions. Europe changes not by choice, but by pressure.

This would of course be slow, politically messy, and uncomfortable. The point is not that this is easy, but that pressure eventually removes alternatives.

§My base and dramatic case

There is a world in which little changes as all sides exercise restraint, but also a world in which things soon accelerate dramatically. Given what is at play here, the end result may be similar, with the only difference being the speed and violence required to get there, imo.

**My base case is that Russia goes further into Ukraine **because the costs are tolerable for them and the window appears open, with US backing down and Europe not stepping in meaningfully. This conflict is already hot so they may as well keep going.

The US consolidates where it can do so cheaply and decisively, with Greenland the first clear target, which they will take over. China does not move on Taiwan, not out of patience or weakness, but because the cost of doing so is prohibitive, i.e. the pain is not worth it, something Russia may wish it had appreciated more fully before entering Ukraine.

Europe, under this pressure, is forced into a binary choice. Either it accepts a gradual loss of relevance, or it reconstructs itself as a serious military power. If it chooses the latter, Europe begins to resemble Taiwan or Cold War Korea: militarised not because it wants to but because it has to.

This will be a world of German and Italian nukes, 5% European GDP spending on their armed forces, which puts its budget at $850bn, an order of magnitudes larger than Russia and China.

A Europe that remilitarises and enforces its external borders, will be a different Europe altogether. Before it gets there of course, it has to first see a certain political shift, likely to be achieved once the AfD comes to power in Germany and RN in France.

This is the strange political split Europe finds itself in today: the most fervent EU supporters are the ones most passionate about a Europe projecting its powers, but the nationalist fervour they really need to back this up tends to find itself on another side of the political spectrum altogether. The US taking Greenland or Russia the Baltics may be just what pushes these to converge. It will be a wounded but roaring Europe.

This Europe - whether in possession of Ukraine, Greenland and the Baltics or not, will slowly evolve into a different beast altogether. As the two major forces that have no major disputes, China and the EU are likely to align while the western alliance is shattered.

What follows is not a restored rules-based order, but a long-run equilibrium. An awkward triangle forms: the US and Russia converge tactically in constantly pressuring Europe; Russia and China remain bound by necessity instead of trust, while China and Europe align to prevent the system from tipping into open conflict. Africa and Latin America will lean towards the China-Europe axis, the former naturally and the latter under some pressure from US-Russia.

In this world, the global hegemon will be replaced by three competing blocs. Financially, this world looks nothing like the last thirty years. Reserve currencies like the dollar will come down to earth, real rates as well as inflation moves structurally higher.

Capital becomes less mobile, equity valuations compress, and real assets regain primacy over financial ones. Bitcoin, gold and silver grow year after year. Emerging markets stop trading as a bloc and start trading as geopolitical bets.